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ABSTRACT
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U.S. company enters into a contract for the sale of goods with a
foreign counterparty. Scholars have long debated the role the
CISG plays in contract practice in the United States. Some argue
that the CISG has come to be embraced, if slowly, by U.S. lawyers. Others contend that the CISG has yet to achieve widespread acceptance within the U.S. legal community. Prior studies have sought to resolve this debate by looking to surveys of
practicing attorneys. This Article seeks to shed light on this
question by looking to actual contracts entered into by U.S.
companies.
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stand the role that the CISG plays in U.S. contract practice. The
Article shows that: (1) many U.S. companies reflexively exclude
the CISG without inquiring as to whether it would apply of its
own force; (2) U.S. companies virtually never select the CISG as
the law to govern their agreements; (3) there is no industry or
geographic location within the United States where the CISG
has been affirmatively embraced; (4) some U.S. companies that
had selected the CISG in the past now have a policy of excluding it from their contracts; and (5) U.S. companies are frequently
unaware that selecting the law of a U.S. state can result in the
application of the CISG.
These findings suggest a number of important insights.
First, they show that past surveys of U.S. lawyers dramatically
overstate the extent to which the CISG has gained acceptance
within the U.S. legal community. Second, they indicate that
contract practice with respect to the CISG can and does vary
from nation to nation. The dataset contracts show that Chinese
solar companies, in contrast to their U.S. counterparts, have embraced the CISG. Finally, they highlight the potential unfairness
of requiring unsophisticated U.S. companies to litigate international contract disputes under a set of treaty rules that are routinely avoided by their more sophisticated brethren.
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1. INTRODUCTION
When the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) entered into force on January 1,
1988, it was heralded as a singular achievement in the annals of
private international law.1 Scholars were quick to extol the CISG as
“a ‘quantum leap,’ a ‘new legal lingua franca,’ a ‘milestone,’ a ‘triumph of comparative legal work’ and ‘arguably the greatest legislative achievement aimed at harmonizing private commercial
law.’”2 They praised its drafters for creating a uniform international sales law “that promotes fair and honorable solutions without affording any obvious or hidden advantages to either side.”3
They spoke of the treaty’s importance as a solution to choice-of-law
problems that had long bedeviled national courts.4 And they marveled at the speed with which various nations around the world
(including the United States) had acted to ratify the CISG.5 Judged
1 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter
CISG]; Kevin Bell, The Sphere of Application of the Vienna Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, 8 PACE INT’L L. REV. 237, 23738 (1996) (“The United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods is ‘rapidly
becoming one of the most successful multi-lateral treaties ever in the field of
agreements designed to unify rules traditionally addressed only in domestic legal
systems.’”) (footnote omitted).
2 Bell, supra note 1, at 238 (footnotes omitted); see also Larry A. DiMatteo, The
Scholarly Response to the Harmonization of International Sales Law, 30 J.L. & COM. 1, 21
(2011) (“From humble beginnings, the CISG has grown to be an international
phenomenon. It is no longer premature to hail it as the first successful unification
of international sales law. It is the culmination of the dream presented by Ernst
Rabel in the 1920s.”).
3 Susanne Cook, CISG: From the Perspective of the Practitioner, 17 J.L. & COM.
343, 350 (1998).
4 See Fritz Enderlein & Dietrich Maskow, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW 1 (1992);
see also Franco Ferrari, PIL and CISG: Friends or Foes?, 31 J.L. & COM. 45, 4648
(2013).
5 See UNITED NATIONS COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, STATUS UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS,
www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG_status.html
[https://perma.cc/2P2E-79QM] (last visited Dec. 7, 2016) [hereinafter
UNCITRAL, Status on CISG] (listing eighty-five contracting parties to the CISG);
see also Peter Huber, Some Introductory Remarks on the CISG, 6 INTERNATIONALES
HANDELSRECHT [INT’L TRADE L.] 228, 228 (2006) (“The CISG is in force in more than
60 States from all parts of the world, among them both industrial nations and developing states. . . . It is therefore fair to say that the CISG has in fact been one of
the success stories in the field of the international unification of private law.”)
(footnote omitted).
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in accordance with these metrics—skillful drafting, substantive
harmonization, and number of ratifications—there can be little
doubt that the CISG is a runaway success story. Indeed, by these
metrics the CISG ranks among the most successful commercial law
treaties in modern history.
Judged in accordance with a different metric—how frequently
private parties actually use the CISG—the evidence of success is
less clear. The CISG specifically provides that contracting parties
are free to exclude it from their contracts.6 In cases where the CISG
is excluded, the contracts will be governed by national sales law.
Several recent surveys of attorneys in the United States and Europe
suggest that more than half of respondents in some jurisdictions
routinely urge their clients to exclude the CISG from their contracts.7 These surveys suggest that a sizeable number of attorneys
routinely advise clients engaged in international sales transactions
to “opt out” of a set of international rules whose sole purpose is to
facilitate those transactions and “opt in” to a set of national rules of
general application. If these surveys are accurate, they call into
question whether the CISG is achieving its intended purpose of facilitating international trade by reducing legal uncertainty in international transactions.
This Article represents the first attempt to look at non-survey
data in order to determine the extent to which private actors actually use the CISG.8 It draws upon an original dataset of more than
5,000 contracts in an attempt to determine the extent to which private parties select or exclude the treaty in their international sales
6 See CISG art. 6. Although the CISG constitutes a set of default rules, these
rules are “sticky” in that they will apply unless the parties expressly opt out. For
a discussion on how to interpret contractual silence in a world of sticky default
rules, see infra Section 3.2.
7 See infra notes 63 - 86 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion of CISG
from U.S. contracts).
8 Another recent study adopted a similar methodology, albeit with respect to
a different contract dataset, to explore why parties draft choice-of-law clauses that
select national law in their international contracts. See Gilles Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attractive Contract Laws, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. &
BUS. 455, 455 (2014). Cuniberti’s conclusion that transacting parties tend to choose
English and Swiss law more frequently than the law of other nations is generally
consistent with the findings set forth in this Article. See infra note 106 (explaining
how foreign counterparties sometimes prefer to have the law of England govern
its international sales contracts over U.S. law); see also Gilles Cuniberti, The Laws of
Asian International Business Transactions, 25 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 35, 35 (2016)
(finding that English law, U.S. law, and, to a lesser extent, Singapore law dominate the market for law in international contracts in Asia).
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agreements.9 It also draws upon a number of interviews with inhouse attorneys at U.S. companies in an attempt to better understand the factors that influence international choice-of-law decisions at the company level. These sources give rise to a number of
specific findings with respect to U.S. contract practice as it relates
to the CISG.
First, U.S. companies routinely exclude the CISG from contracts
to which it would never apply. It is common, for example, for U.S.
companies to exclude the CISG from (1) wholly domestic agreements, (2) contracts not for the sale of goods, and (3) contracts with
a foreign counterparty that has its principal place of business in a
nation that has not ratified the CISG. This pattern of practice suggests that many U.S. companies reflexively exclude the CISG from
their contracts.
Second, the number of U.S. companies that affirmatively
choose the CISG is negligible. While it is not strictly necessary for
the parties to select the CISG in order for it to govern their contract,
there are many good reasons why they may wish to do so if, in
fact, they want it to provide the governing law. The fact that a
vanishingly small number of U.S. companies have done so in recent years suggests that the treaty has gained little ground as an alternative to national sales law within the U.S. legal community.
Third, the CISG lacks any clear locus of support within the
United States. A comprehensive review of the dataset contracts in
which the CISG was chosen as the governing law failed to identify
any particular U.S. industry or U.S. state in which that treaty has
been embraced. To the extent that the CISG has a constituency in
the United States, that constituency appears to consist principally
of law professors. There is no evidence suggesting that it has been
widely embraced by private actors actually engaged in buying and
selling goods in international trade.
Fourth, the CISG derives remarkably little support today even
among those companies that have selected it to govern their contracts in the past. Several of the companies that had chosen the
CISG as the governing law in prior contracts now report that their
first preference is for contracts to be governed by the law of their
home nation. Their second preference is for the national sales law
of a neutral third country. The CISG is chosen only as a last resort
in contracting situations that present idiosyncratic issues that arise
9 See infra notes 5156 and accompanying text (discussing the process by
which this Article’s dataset was assembled).
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infrequently in the ordinary course of business.
Fifth, companies in other countries have proved more welcoming with respect to the CISG than U.S. companies. Chinese solar
companies, for example, are CISG enthusiasts. They routinely
choose it to govern their international sales agreement. While
there is an element of self-interest here—Chinese national sales law
mirrors the CISG in many respects—the contracts dataset suggest
that the CISG has achieved a greater level of acceptance in China
than it has in the United States.
Finally, there is no evidence that U.S. companies knowingly select the CISG “indirectly” when they choose to have their international supply contracts governed by the law of a U.S. state without
referencing the CISG. A number of U.S. judges have reasoned that
because the law of the State of New York necessarily includes federal law, and federal law necessarily includes properly ratified
treaties like the CISG, the choice of New York law amounts to a de
facto selection of the CISG.10 However attractive this syllogism
may seem as a matter of logic, it is inconsistent with the lived experiences of many U.S. companies that are unaware that the selection
of New York law may result in the application of the CISG.
In summary, the evidence derived from a review of the available contracts paints a far bleaker picture than do existing attorney
surveys with respect to the role of the CISG in U.S. contract practice. These findings have significant implications for the ongoing
scholarly debate as to the impact of the CISG. Some scholars have
taken the position that “[e]ven though much has been written
about the skepticism of commercial practice towards the Convention and of the CISG’s allegedly minor role in the legal community,
today this position may be regarded as by and large disproven.”11
Other scholars have argued that “the claim that the CISG is generally being excluded in practice, although still often heard and read,
is not supported by empirical evidence.”12 Though one must be
cautious not to read too much into a single study, the empirical evidence presented in this Article suggests that U.S. attorneys are
quite skeptical of the CISG and that U.S. companies do regularly
10 See, e.g., Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. SaintGobain Tech. Fabrics Can.
Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 108182 (D. Minn. 2007).
11 Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, The CISGSuccesses and Pitfalls, 57
AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 458 (2009) (footnote omitted).
12 Ulrich G. Schroeter, Empirical Evidence of Courts’ and Counsels’ Approach to
the CISG (with Some Remarks on Professional Liability), in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW
A GLOBAL CHALLENGE 649, 66768 (Larry A. DiMatteo ed., 2014).
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exclude this treaty from their international supply agreements.13
These findings squarely contract the claims made by the scholars
quoted above.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part 2 offers a brief history of
the CISG and reviews the existing empirical scholarship as it relates to CISG opt outs. Part 3 describes the methodology used in
assembling the primary dataset of contracts used in this Article.
Part 4 draws upon this dataset, along with a number of supplemental interviews with individuals who helped to draft these
agreements, to describe the role that the CISG plays in U.S. contract
practice today. Part 5 discusses how and why the patterns of practice in China currently differ from those in the United States. Part
6 describes the methodology used in assembling a secondary dataset of contracts. It then draws upon interviews with individuals
who helped to draft these agreements to show that U.S. companies
that select the law of a U.S. state to govern their international supply agreements generally do not intend for these contracts to be
governed by the CISG.

2. THE EXISTING EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
On April 11, 1980, representatives of sixty-two nations voted
unanimously to approve the text of the United Nations Convention
on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.14 This vote
marked the culmination of more than twelve years of drafting
work conducted under the auspices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).15 The treaty
outlined uniform rules relating to contract formation, the statute of
frauds, anticipatory breach, damages, and other substantive rules
13 See also Peter L. Fitzgerald, The International Contracting Practices Survey
Project: An Empirical Study of the Value and Utility of the United Nations Convention
on the International Sale of Goods (CISG) and the Unidroit Principles of International
Commercial Contracts to Practitioners, Jurists, and Legal Academics in the United States,
27 J.L. & COM. 1, 25 (2008) (arguing that the CISG is “still largely unknown and
seldom seen in practice today.”).
14 JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 3 (3d ed. 1999).
15 See id. at 910 (describing the draft process organized by UNCITRAL,
which culminated in a final draft finalized by 62 states and eight international organizations in March 1980).
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of contract law that would apply to international sales agreements.
When the CISG entered into force on January 1, 1988, it had been
ratified by eleven nations, including the United States. As of December 2016, the CISG had been ratified by eighty-five nations.16
Significantly, the list of ratifying countries includes nations from all
corners of the world and nations at all levels of economic development.
In the many scholarly books and articles written about the
CISG over the past several decades, the treaty is typically described
as a resounding success story across three specific dimensions.17
First, scholars praise the text of the treaty for providing clear legal
rules that may be easily understood by attorneys from many different legal traditions.18 Second, scholars note that the CISG repreUNCITRAL, Status on CISG, supra note 5 (listing ratifying nations).
See generally Martin Karollus, Judicial Interpretation and Application of the
CISG in Germany 19881994, in REVIEW OF THE CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 51, 77 (Cornell Int’l Law Review ed., 1995)
(“The CISG seems to be well on the way to becoming the Magna Carta of international trade.”); Volker Behr, The Sales Convention in Europe: From Problems in Drafting to Problems in Practice, 17 J.L. & COM. 263, 264 (1998) (“From the point of view
of legislation as well as from the point of view of practical application, the Convention seems to be a success.”); Ronald A. Brand & Harry M. Flechtner, Arbitration and Contract Formation in International Trade: First Interpretations of the U.N.
Sales Convention, 12 J.L. & COM. 239, 239 (1993) (“The acceptance of the rules of
CISG by nations with widely-differing domestic legal systems located on every
inhabited continent holds the promise of a quantum jump in the uniformity of legal rules governing sales transactions, with significant benefits for international
trade.”); Michael P. Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation
Through the Prism of Uniform International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (1996) (“It
can be said with little risk of overstatement that the [CISG] represents one of history’s most successful efforts at the unification of the law governing international
transactions.”) (footnote omitted); Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note 11, at 478
(“All in all the story of the CISG has been one of worldwide success. Criticism that
has been put forward can largely be either rejected as unfounded to begin with or
met by a correct interpretation of the Convention.”).
18 See Joseph M. Lookofsky, Loose Ends and Contorts in International Sales: Problems in the Harmonization of Private Law Rules, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 403, 404 (1991)
(stating that the CISG is “‘relatively straightforward and uncluttered with detail,’
not only because domestic anacronisms [sic] have been refined away, but also because some unsightly loose ends were tucked under the rug.”) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 69 (1st ed. 1982)); HONNOLD, supra note 14, at 8
(praising skill and dedication of UNCITRAL Secretariat, who aids with “analyzing the divergences among the existing legal rules; reports on commercial practices to assist in making a choice among alternative solutions to pirvotal [sic] factual
examples; draft statutory texts formulated, at crucial spots, with clearly labelled
alternatives to facilitate debate and decision with a minimum of confusion or misunderstanding.”); Cook, supra note 3, at 345 n.12 (“UNCITRAL skillfully executed
its plan of drafting a sales convention based upon input from all interest
16
17
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sents a solution to choice-of-law problems that had long bedeviled
national courts.19 By harmonizing the substantive international
law of sales, the CISG largely eliminated the need for a national
court to conduct a choice-of-law analysis in cases involving international sales.20 Third, scholars cite the number of ratifications to
date as evidence of the CISG’s success.21 It was and remains quite
rare for a commercial law treaty to gain such widespread acceptance in the international community.22

groups.”).
19 See Paul Schiff Berman, The Inevitable Legal Pluralism Within Universal Harmonization Regimes: The Case of the CISG, 21 UNIFORM L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (“To its
backers, the CISG addresses intractable problems of legal uncertainty and forum
shopping, creating a stable global law of trade.”); John F. Coyle, Rethinking the
Commercial Law Treaty, 45 GA. L. REV. 343, 345 (2011) (discussing the problem of
legal uncertainty in international transactions) (footnote omitted).
20 See Henry Mather, Choice of Law for International Sales Issues Not Resolved by
the CISG, 20 J.L. & COM. 155, 155 (2001) (observing that the CISG “should substantially reduce the need for choice of law by American courts.”); see also John
Felemegas, Introduction, in AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO THE INTERPRETATION
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE
OF GOODS (1980) AS UNIFORM SALES LAW 1, 4 (John Felemegas ed., 2007) (“A uniform law would provide parties with greater certainty as to their potential rights
and obligations. This is to be compared with the results brought about by the
amorphous principles of private international law and the possible application of
an unfamiliar system of foreign domestic law.”) (footnote omitted). Where a contract dispute turns on issues outside of the ambit of the CISG, of course, it will still
be necessary for a national court to engage in a choice-of-law analysis with respect
to those issues. See CISG art. 4(a).
21 See del Pilar Perales Viscasillas, Contract Conclusion under CISG, 16 J.L. &
COM. 315, 315 (1997) (“This wide acceptance on the part of states with different
social, legal, and economic systems demonstrates the considerable success
achieved by the Convention.”); see also Alejandro M. Garro, Perspectives, Reconciliation of Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods, 23 INT’L LAW. 443, 482 (1989) (“UNCITRAL’s success in adopting a Convention with wider acceptability is evidenced by the fact that the original eleven
States for which the Convention came into force . . . included countries from every
geographical region, every stage of economic development, and every major legal,
social, and economic system.”); Cook, supra note 3, at 349 (“CISG has been a tremendous international success: . . . it has been accepted by fifty Contracting States
as the law that governs the international sale of good.”) (footnote omitted); Schroeter, supra note 12, at 649 (observing CISG has been ratified by fifteen of the
world’s twenty leading exporters and is “the law applicable to 75% of the world’s
exports and imports . . . .”) (footnote omitted).
22 Only a few commercially important nations, including the United Kingdom, India, and Taiwan, have declined to ratify the CISG. In the annals of international commercial law, only the New York Convention, which addresses the
topic of international commercial arbitration, has been ratified by more nations
than the CISG.
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All of these accolades are entirely deserved. The CISG is an
impressive feat of legal draftsmanship. The CISG does offer a potential solution to perennial problem of indeterminate choice-oflaw rules. And the CISG has been ratified by a remarkable number
of nations. All too often, however, scholarly accounts fail to mention perhaps the most important metric for evaluating the success
of the CISG: whether contracting parties actually use it in their private transactions. On this metric, the evidence of the CISG’s success is less clear cut.23
In order to understand why widespread ratification of the
CISG may not automatically translate into widespread usage by
private parties, it is useful to review the rules that determine when
the CISG will and will not supply the governing law in private
sales contracts. By its terms, the CISG applies to (1) contracts for
the sale of goods between (2) parties whose places of business are
in different nations when (3) at least one of the nations in question
has ratified the CISG.24 It is possible, however, for parties to opt
out of the CISG.25 If the parties exclude the CISG by writing a
clause to that effect into their contracts, the treaty will not supply
the governing law. In such cases, the contract will be governed by
the national sales law selected by the parties or, if no such law is
selected, then by the national sales law chosen after the court performs a choice-of-law analysis. This ability of private parties to opt
out of the CISG means that looking solely to whether a country has
ratified the CISG is an imperfect proxy for determining the extent
to which the CISG is used by private actors. One must also inquire
as to whether these parties regularly exercise their rights under the
CISG to exclude that treaty as a source of law.
In recent years, a number of scholars have sought to determine
how frequently contracting parties choose to exclude the CISG
from their international sales contracts by conducting surveys of
23 Jan M. Smits, Problems of Uniform Laws, in INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A
GLOBAL CHALLENGE 605, 607 (Larry A. DiMatteo ed., 2014) (“[I]n every case in
which a party is aware of the existence of the CISG and its potential applicability
to the contract, there is an empirical test of its usefulness.”).
24 See CISG art. 1. The United States has made a declaration under article 95
of the CISG stipulating that it will only apply to contracts involving a U.S. party
where both of the nations have ratified the CISG. See infra note 63.
25 Article 6 of the CISG provides that “[t]he parties may exclude the application of this Convention or . . . derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.” CISG art. 6.
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practicing attorneys.26 In the United States, for example, three surveys conducted between 2004 and 2007 found that between 55%
and 71% of U.S. attorneys typically advised their clients to opt out
of the CISG.27 In Germany, two surveys conducted in 2004 found
that between 45% and 73% of German attorneys usually recommended that their clients opt out.28 In Austria, a survey conducted
in 2007 found that 55% of Austrian attorneys typically recommended opting out.29 In Switzerland, a survey conducted in 2008
found that 62% of Swiss attorneys recommend opting out at least
some of the time.30 In China, by contrast, a survey conducted in
2007 found that only 37% of Chinese attorneys typically urged
their clients to opt out of the CISG.31 Taken as a whole, these surveys suggest that more than half of the attorney respondents in a
number of important commercial jurisdictions routinely counsel
their clients to exclude the CISG from their international sales contracts.32
In late 2009, UNCITRAL provided logistical support for a re26 For a thorough overview of the empirical data on this topic, see L ISA
SPAGNOLO, CISG EXCLUSION AND LEGAL EFFICIENCY 15052, 21218 (2014) (comparing surveys from 2008 and 2011 on CISG international rates of exclusion that indicate downward trend in automatic CISG exclusion rates).
27 See Martin F. Koehler & Guo Yujun, The Acceptance of the Unified Sales Law
(CISG) in Different Legal Systems, 20 PACE INT’L L. REV. 45, 46 – 48 (2008) (explaining how 20042005 surveys conducted with U.S. practitioners indicated that 55.6%
“mostly explicitly excluded” the CISG from their contracts); George V. Philippopoulos, Awareness of the CISG Among American Attorneys, 40 UCC L.J. 357, 361,
363 (2008); Fitzgerald, supra note 13, at 67 tbl.11 (showing 55% of U.S. practitioners
“[s]pecifically opt out of applying the CISG to the transaction”).
28 SPAGNOLO, supra note 26, at 151 n.6.
29 Id. at 151.
30 Corinne Widmer & Pascal Hachem, Switzerland, in THE CISG AND ITS
IMPACT ON NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 281, 285 (Franco Ferrari ed., 2008). That same
survey found that Swiss attorneys were five times more likely to exclude the CISG
than to select it. Id.
31 See Koehler & Guo, supra note 27, at 50 (“The second most often selected
reason in China [for exclusion] was ‘because it is not possible to dissuade our
business partners or the business partners of our client from the application of
their national law’”) (alteration in original); see also SPAGNOLO, supra note 26, at 215
n.176.
32 There is evidence that some contracts between Japanese chemical companies and their U.S. counterparties exclude the CISG. See Yoshimochi Taniguchi,
Deepening Confidence in the Application of CISG to the Sales Agreements Between the
United States and Japanese Companies, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 277, 279 (2013)
(“[I]n most [U.S.Japanese] contracts, the CISG was excluded due to concerns
about how the CISG would be interpreted and/or incompatibility with U.S. or
Japanese law or both.”).
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search project that became known as the Global Sales Law survey.33 The survey invited approximately 9,000 people from around
the world to respond to an online survey.34 These individuals were
drawn from four target groups, including practicing attorneys, arbitrators, businesses engaged in trade, and law professors, and
those who responded to the survey were located in eighty-eight
different countries.35 The survey ultimately generated 640 responses, eighty-five of which came from the United States, that
shed light on global practice as it relates to CISG exclusions.36 The
survey found 12% of U.S. respondents “always” opted out, 42%
“sometimes” opted out, and 46% “never or rarely” opted out.37
The numbers for respondents across all CISG member states were
13% “always” opting out, 32% “sometimes” opting out, and 55%
“never or rarely” opting out.38 The Global Sales Law survey suggests, therefore, that: (1) approximately 45% of all respondents
sometimes or always chose to exclude the CISG from their contracts; and (2) this number jumps to 54% when one looks exclusively at respondents within the United States.
Why do so many attorneys across so many jurisdictions advise
their clients to exclude the CISG? Scholars have advanced a number of possible explanations. First, there is the problem of lack of
familiarity.39 Attorneys are more likely to be familiar with their
own national sales law than they are with an international treaty
and, consequently, are more likely to recommend that their clients
choose to have their contracts governed by the law they know
best.40 Second, and relatedly, many attorneys will never have ocSee INGEBORG SCHWENZER, PASCAL HACHEM & CHRISTOPHER KEE, GLOBAL
SALES AND CONTRACT LAW 70 (2012) (“The Global Sales Law survey was conducted
online towards the end of 2009 and was supported by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). The survey was conducted in
the six UN languages.”) (footnote omitted).
34 Id.
35 See id. (“Approximately 5,000 individuals received personally addressed
letters in United Nations envelopes, and there were four target
groupspractising [sic] lawyers, arbitrators, businesses engaging in trade, and
law schools.”).
36 See id. (“The survey website received more than 1,500 hits and 640 useable
responses.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 70 n.23 (listing number of responses from
each jurisdiction).
37 Id. at 73.
38 Id.
39 See SPAGNOLO, supra note 26, at 15255.
40 See id. at 153. Some scholars have argued that attorneys who advise their
clients to exclude the CISG on lack of familiarity grounds are in breach of their
33
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casion to litigate or arbitrate a case in which the CISG provides the
governing law.41 Given this reality, it is rational for these attorneys
not to invest substantial time and energy into educating themselves as to the CISG’s content, which in turn makes it more likely
that they will recommend that their clients exclude it from their
sales contracts.42
Third, some legal scholars in the United States have argued
that the substantive content of the CISG does a poorer job than
does the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) at approximating the
unstated preferences of the parties, and is therefore a relatively less
efficient set of default rules.43 To the extent that practicing attorneys share these views, they may urge their clients to avoid the
CISG. Finally, some U.S. contracting parties may prefer the UCC
to the CISG not because they view it as substantively superior but
because they believe that it will give them a “home field” advantage.44 On this account, a company may use its superior bargaining power to insist upon the application of a particular set of
national legal rules precisely because these rules are unfamiliar to
their foreign counterparty.45 In the event that the parties wind up
in litigation or arbitration, the party who dictated the choice of law
will, by virtue of its attorneys’ long familiarity with that law, be
better positioned to prevail or to extract a more favorable settlement.
Whatever the precise reasons as to why attorneys often recommend that their clients opt out of the CISG, the survey evidence
discussed above suggests that this practice is widespread. There
are, however, at least two reasons to be cautious about relying too
extensively upon this survey data.
First, the sample sizes for many of these surveys are quite
small. One published survey of attorney attitudes about the CISG,
ethical obligations. See William S. Dodge, Teaching the CISG in Contracts, 50 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 72, 7475 (2000) (discussing a contract dispute where counsel failed
to timely raise possible winning argument on the applicability of CISG). One reason why U.S. attorneys may be generally unfamiliar with the CISG is that many
U.S. law students are not adequately exposed to it as part of their legal training.
See John F. Coyle, The Case for Writing International Law into the U.S. Code, 56 B.C.
L. REV. 433, 46768 (2015) (discussing general lack of exposure to international law
among American attorneys, judges, and law students).
41 See SPAGNOLO, supra note 26, at 15564.
42 See id. at 15864.
43 See id. at 168; see also id. at 16873.
44 See id. at 16668.
45 See id. at 16667.
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for example, received responses from only twenty-seven attorneys
in China, thirty-three attorneys in Germany, and fifty attorneys in
the United States.46 Given the absolute number of attorneys in
each of these jurisdictions—approximately 200,000, 138,000, and
1.26 million, respectively—it is not clear that these sample sizes are
large enough to accurately represent the views of the entire attorney population. Even the Global Sales Law survey, the most ambitious global survey on this topic to date, elicited responses from
only eighty-five respondents in the United States.
Second, all of the above-cited surveys must grapple with methodological issues, including response bias, non-response bias, and
self-selection bias, that may render survey evidence unreliable.
There is the possibility that survey respondents will give answers
that they believe the questioner wants to hear (response bias).47
There is the possibility that certain types of potential respondents,
such as attorneys who are generally unfamiliar with the CISG, will
simply decline to respond to the survey (non-response bias).48 And
there is the possibility that individuals who are wildly enthusiastic
about the CISG, or who intensely dislike it, will take the time to
complete the survey when others do not (self-selection bias).49
This is not to suggest, of course, that all of the published surveys to date are unreliable. Nor is it to suggest the surveys themselves serve no purpose or provide no useful information. It is
merely to point out the potential advantages of seeking to answer
the same basic question—how often contracting parties choose to
46 Koehler & Yujun, supra note 27, at 4647; see also Michael Wallace Gordon,
Part II - Some Thoughts on the Receptiveness of Contract Rules in the CISG and
UNIDROIT Principles as Reflected in One State’s (Florida) Experience of (1) Law School
Faculty, (2) Members of the Bar with an International Practice, and (3) Judges, 46 AM. J.
COMP. L. 361, 36264 (1998) (presenting survey data on Florida legal community’s
experience with CISG without providing the sample size).
47 See Zev J. Eigen & Yair Listokin, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their Own Hype
and Should They?: A Natural Experiment, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 239, 25051 (2012) (discussing problem of response bias in surveys). In the context of the CISG, for example, respondents may shy away from reporting that they “always” exclude it
out of a fear of offending a research team that clearly thinks that the treaty is important enough to warrant conducting a survey relating to it.
48 See Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Consumer Debtors Ten Years Later: A Financial Comparison of Consumer Bankrupts 19811991, 68 AM. BANKR. L.J. 121, 15051 (1994) (discussing the problem of nonresponse bias in surveys).
49 See Rachel F. Moran, Diversity and its Discontents: The End of Affirmative Action at Boalt Hall, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2241, 227374 (2000) (discussing problem of selfselection bias in surveys).
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make use of the CISG when contracting—via a methodological approach other than surveys of practicing attorneys.

3. USING ACTUAL CONTRACTS TO UNDERSTAND CISG PRACTICE
If the goal is to ascertain the role played by the CISG in contemporary contracting practice without resorting to surveys, an alternative approach is to look to the text of actual international sales
contracts. Although these contracts are generally not available to
the public, there is at least one public repository that contains hundreds of thousands of private contracts. This is the Electronic Data
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (“EDGAR”) maintained
by the Securities and Exchange Commission in the United States.50
This Part first describes how I went about assembling a dataset of
contracts that reference the CISG from this database. It then describes the advantages and disadvantages to using these contracts,
as opposed to attorney surveys, to gain insight into CISG contracting practice.
3.1. Assembling the Dataset
In the United States, companies that sell securities to significant
numbers of non-professional investors are required by law to register with the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).51
Thereafter, these companies are periodically required to file certain
information about their business and finances with the SEC.
Among other duties, each reporting company is required to file
with the SEC any “material contract” to which it is a party.52 This
50 Other scholars have also relied on the EDGAR database to gain insight into
party practice as it relates to choice of law. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice
of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475,
1488 n.61 (2009); Sarath Sanga, Choice of Law: An Empirical Analysis, 11 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 894, 90203 (2014).
51 See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2012) (requiring companies that have sold securities
to the public to file “a registration statement . . . with respect to such security containing such information and documents as the Commission may specify”).
52 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10) (2016) (listing criteria for determining whether a contract is “material”); see also Valerie Ford Jacob et al., The New Form 8-K: Fif-
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requirement is significant because it means that the SEC has in its
possession a massive repository of private contracts that would
otherwise be kept hidden from public view.53 These contracts are
accessible online through the EDGAR database.
I worked with a team of research assistants to comb through
the EDGAR database in search of contracts that referred to the
CISG. In order to identify contracts that reference this treaty, we
performed a search for the term “international sale of goods” in
EDGAR Online.54 When we performed a search for this phrase in
all SEC documents filed between January 1, 1988, and December
31, 2014, the search generated 6,911 hits.55 In 105 instances, the
phrase “international sale of goods” was not used to refer to the
CISG. These documents were excluded from the dataset. In the
remaining 6,806 instances in which the phrase was used, it was
contained in a contract that referred to the CISG. There were,
however, a significant number of instances in which the same contract appeared multiple times in the dataset. After the duplicates
were removed, there were 5,092 contracts remaining. This group
of 5,092 unique contracts constitutes the primary dataset of contracts analyzed in this Article.56 This group includes a wide range
of contract types and is not comprised exclusively of international
sales agreements; any contract that referenced the CISG was included.
Once the dataset was created, I again worked with a team of research assistants to review the contracts within it in an attempt to
answer a number of questions. Most significantly, we sought to
discover whether these contracts generally referred to the CISG in
teen Items Every General Counsel Needs to Know, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 42, 43
(2006) (discussing disclosure requirement for material amendments to material
contracts).
53 The overwhelming majority of private contracts are, of course, kept under
lock and key by parties who have no reason to make public the details of their
private business arrangements.
54 This phrase was chosen because our initial forays into the database revealed that parties referred to the CISG in many different ways. In almost every
instance, however, the formulation utilized by the parties contained the phrase
“international sale of goods.”
55 The SEC did not mandate that all public companies submit their filings
through EDGAR until May 6, 1996. The earliest dated contract that referenced the
CISG was filed on January 21, 1994.
56 One recent study found that a total of 705,669 unique material contracts
were filed with the SEC between 1996 and 2012. See Sanga, supra note 50, at 903.
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order to exclude it as a source of governing law or to choose it as a
source of governing law. The goal was to obtain a better sense of
the role that the CISG played in these agreements and to determine
whether there had been any changes in CISG contract practice over
time.
We also coded a subset of these contracts—those in which the
CISG was affirmatively selected as the governing law—for a number of other variables, including the nationality of the buyer and
seller, the industry of the filing company, the type of contract at issue, and the type of goods being sold. This information made it
possible to draw more general conclusions about which companies
were most likely to choose the CISG to govern their contracts. The
goal was to determine whether there were any pockets of support
for the CISG within the United States and elsewhere. With this
same end in mind, I also sent letters to all of the U.S. companies
and many of the foreign companies that had affirmatively chosen
the CISG to govern their agreements to inquire as to why they had
made this choice.
3.2. Benefits and Drawbacks
There are a number of virtues in the methodological approach
outlined above. First, the dataset contracts constitute a historical
record that cannot be changed or misremembered. In this respect,
they may be a more reliable indicator of party practice than the
recollections of attorneys responding to a survey. Second, it is easier to review thousands of documents than it is to obtain survey responses from thousands of people. A contract-based approach
thus makes it possible to draw upon a larger sample size while at
the same time reducing the likelihood that response bias, nonresponse bias, or self-selection bias will influence the results.
Third, these contracts contain a host of other data, such as the industry and nationality of the buyer and seller to specific agreements, that can provide useful context for the underlying decision
to select or to exclude the CISG as a source of law. The availability
of this contextual data makes it possible to paint a deeper and richer portrait of CISG practice than would be possible through survey
data alone.
There are, however, a number of drawbacks to relying upon a
review of contracts to gain insight into CISG practice. First and
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foremost, there is the problem of selection bias. Every single contract in the EDGAR dataset is a material contract that was filed with
the SEC by a public company. In other words, the universe of contracts examined as part of this project consisted exclusively of important agreements filed by companies that are disproportionately
larger and wealthier than the typical company. In addition, public
companies that enter into high-stakes contracts are more likely to
be concerned about legal uncertainty than are smaller companies
entering into low-stakes contracts. To the extent that national law
is viewed as providing a more predictable legal framework than
the CISG, the dataset contracts are likely to contain a greater proportion of opt outs than in the contract population as a whole. In
other words, given the limitations on the contracts available, a review of these and only these contracts may not paint an accurate
portrait of contracting practice in the aggregate.57
Second, one might argue that there are two purposes for rules
of uniform international sales law: (1) to provide uniform law to be
chosen by the parties; and (2) to provide uniform law as default
rules when no choice is made. A contract review of the type undertaken in this Article only addresses the first of these purposes.
It may be that the second purpose, which focuses on litigation rather than transactional planning, is reason enough by itself to validate the CISG. The widespread ratification of the CISG has allowed national courts in many countries to avoid difficult choiceof-law analyses in the context of domestic litigation. It has also enabled national judges to apply the (relatively more familiar) CISG
in cases in which they would otherwise have had to apply the (relatively less familiar) law of a foreign jurisdiction. Therefore, to the
extent this Article is focused primarily on transactional planning as
manifested in contract drafting, it may fail to fully account for other benefits that may flow from the widespread ratification of the
CISG in situations involving oral contracts or written contracts that
lack a choice-of-law provision.58
57 The critique that these contracts are not representative, however, cuts both
ways. The contracts in the dataset were negotiated and drafted by individuals
representing public companies. These companies can generally afford to hire
high-quality legal counsel—the elite members of the U.S. bar—to specifically advise them on these agreements. If these elite attorneys regularly counsel their clients to opt out of the CISG, then this is a significant finding.
58 See United Nations Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, UNCITAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/1980CISG.html
[https://perma.cc/EYE3-QUHB] (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (“Small and medium-
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Third, every contract in the primary dataset references the
CISG in some way. Some reference the CISG to exclude it. Others
reference the CISG in order to choose it. In both cases, the contract
mentions the CISG by name. There are, by contrast, no contracts in
the primary dataset that do not reference the CISG at all. This is
potentially a problem because the CISG will apply to govern international sales contracts when the parties fail to mention it in at
least two specific instances: (1) where the parties fail altogether to
address the issue of choice of law; and (2) where the parties select
the law of a particular U.S. state but do not reference the CISG.
In the first instance, where the parties fail to make any mention
of governing law, the CISG will apply as a default rule so long as
the contract is for the sale of goods, the parties’ places of business
are in different nations, and the nations in question have both ratified the CISG.59 In cases such as these, it is difficult to know what
the parties were thinking. On the one hand, it is possible that they
knew the CISG would apply as a default rule and felt that there
was no need to include a choice-of-law clause in the agreement.
On the other hand, it is possible that the parties were entirely unaware of the CISG’s potential applicability and assumed that the
contract would be governed by national sales law. Since the only
contracts selected for inclusion in the primary dataset are those
that specifically reference the CISG, this dataset will have little to
tell us about the preferences of those parties whose contracts failed
altogether to address the question of choice of law.60
In the second instance, where the parties choose to have their
contract governed by the law of a particular U.S. state but make no
reference to the CISG, the CISG will also supply the governing law.
sized enterprises as well as traders located in developing countries typically have
reduced access to legal advice when negotiating a contract. Thus, they are more
vulnerable to problems caused by inadequate treatment in the contract of issues
relating to applicable law. The same enterprises and traders may also be the
weaker contractual parties and could have difficulties in ensuring that the contractual balance is kept. Those merchants would therefore derive particular benefit from the default application of the fair and uniform regime of the CISG to contracts falling under its scope.”); David P. Stewart, Private International Law, the Rule
of Law, and Economic Development, 56 VILL. L. REV. 607, 61011 (2011) (“In an increasingly interconnected world, the harmonization and codification functions of
private international law assume ever-greater practical importance in promoting
trade, commerce, and economic development.”).
59 See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
60 A prior study found that approximately 89% of contracts on file in the
EDGAR database contain choice-of-law clauses. Sanga, supra note 50, at 903.
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At first glance, this may seem surprising. It is not obvious that a
choice-of-law clause selecting the law of New York would result in
the application of the CISG. Most U.S. courts have reasoned, however, that New York law necessarily includes all forms of federal
law and that the CISG—as a properly ratified federal treaty—is
therefore a part of the law of New York.61 This interpretive rule
necessarily presents a challenge to any attempt to gain insight into
CISG contracting practice. On the one hand, parties may choose
the law of New York to govern their contracts in full knowledge
that this choice will result in the application of the CISG. On the
other hand, parties may choose the law of New York without realizing that this choice amounts to an indirect selection of CISG.62 If
the parties truly want the CISG to govern their contract, then one
would think that they would say as much by naming it in their
agreement. There is, however, no requirement that they do so.
This issue is addressed in Part 6.

61 See Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. SaintGobain Tech. Fabrics Can.
Ltd., 474 F. Supp. 2d at 108182. The practical effect of this line of cases is that
even a choice-of-law clause expressly selecting “the laws of New York” or “the
laws of California” that makes no reference to the CISG will generally result in the
application of the CISG. See William P. Johnson, Understanding Exclusion of the
CISG: A New Paradigm of Determining Party Intent, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 213, 24859
(2011) (discussing U.S. case law on choice-of-law analysis when CISG is not excluded). By contrast, where the parties state that their contract is to be governed
by the “New York Uniform Commercial Code,” then this formulation will typically be read to have excluded the CISG because it is logically impossible for both the
CISG and the New York UCC to govern the same agreement.
62 While there is some scattered evidence that the latter scenario is the more
common one, there is no way to know for certain what the parties intend when
they select national sales law as the law to govern their contract. See Asante Tech.,
Inc. v. PMCSierra, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2001); see also Mathias Reimann, The CISG in the United States: Why It Has Been Neglected and Why
Europeans Should Care, 71 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES UND
INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT [RABEL J. COMP. INT’L PRIV. L.] 115, 12023 (2007)
(considering “fundamental ignorance,” “illicit avoidance,” and “conscious exclusion” as reasons for lack of CISG litigation in U.S. courts); Coyle, supra note 19, at
37083 (discussing studies and data concerning the CISG and challenging the assertion that national actors perceive the CISG to be superior to national commercial law).
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4. SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT U.S. CONTRACT PRACTICE AS IT
RELATES TO THE CISG
A comprehensive review of the contracts in the primary dataset
supports a number of general observations about the nature of U.S.
contract practice as it relates to the CISG. Significantly, the picture
that emerges from this review paints a very different and more
pessimistic picture of U.S. practice than the one painted by the existing survey evidence. These contracts suggest that: (1) U.S. companies routinely exclude the CISG from contracts to which it
would not otherwise apply; (2) the number of U.S. companies that
select the CISG to govern their contracts is small and declining; (3)
the CISG lacks broad support within any industry or geographic
region within the United States; and (4) some companies that had
selected the CISG in the past now have a policy of excluding it
from their contracts.
4.1. U.S. Companies Routinely Exclude the CISG from Contracts to
Which It Would Never Apply
The CISG, by its terms, applies exclusively to contracts for the
sale of goods where the contracting parties have their places of
business in different countries and both of the countries in question
have ratified the CISG.63 It follows, therefore, that there is no need
for the parties to exclude the CISG when: (1) the contract does not
involve the sale of goods; (2) the parties have their places of busi63 The CISG states that it may supply the governing law where only one contracting party has its place of business in a country that has ratified the CISG and
“the rules of private international law lead to the application of the law of [the ratifying nation].” CISG art. 1(1)(b). However, Article 95 of the CISG allows a nation
to make a reservation at the time that it ratifies the CISG, stating that it will not be
bound by Article 1(1)(b). See CISG art. 95. The United States has made an Article
95 declaration. See Impuls I.D. Internacional, S.L. v. PsionTeklogix Inc., 234 F.
Supp. 2d 1267, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (“The United States specifically rejected being
bound by subparagraph (1)(b).”). Consequently, the CISG will only apply to contracts involving U.S. parties when the foreign counterparty has its place of business in a country that has also ratified the CISG. Cf. Prime Start Ltd. v. Maher
Forest Prods. Ltd., 442 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (“Because not all
parties are from countries that signed the CISG, the CISG cannot apply to this
dispute, even if a traditional choice-of-law analysis leads to the application of the
law of the United States (or one of its states) or any other signatory State. Accordingly, some body of law other than the CISG will govern this dispute.”).
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ness in the same country; or (3) one of the parties hails from a
country that has not ratified the CISG. A review of the U.S. contracts in the dataset, however, suggests that companies routinely
exclude the CISG from contracts in each of these situations.
First, it is common for U.S. companies to exclude the CISG
from wholly domestic contracts. A biodiesel purchase agreement
between a Tennessee buyer and an Iowa seller.64 A distribution
agreement between a New Mexico seller and a Michigan buyer.65
A manufacturing and supply agreement between a Pennsylvania
manufacturer and a California buyer.66 A patent license agreement
between two California companies.67 In each of these contracts, the
parties excluded the CISG. In each case, however, the exclusion
was unnecessary because the CISG only applies where the parties
have their places of business in different countries.
Second, there are a number of dataset contracts where the CISG
is excluded from a contract involving a foreign counterparty whose
home country has not ratified the CISG. A manufacturing and
supply agreement between a California company and an Irish
company.68 A distribution agreement between a California company and an English company.69 A manufacturing and supply
agreement between a North Carolina company and an Indian
64 E.g., Pilot Travel Centers LLC, Biodiesel Purchase Agreement with REG
Mktg. and Logistics Grp. (Form 10-Q) Exhibit 10.1 (May 9, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1463258/000144530514002070/regi2014q1xex101.htm [https://perma.cc/4XGL-LE58].
65 E.g., Enerpulse Techs., Inc., Distribution Agreement with Green Bridge
Technologies
LLC
(Form
8-K)
Exhibit
10.1
(Nov.
7,
2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1495899/000114420414065901/v393
592_ex10-1.htm [https://perma.cc/HY9N-YD5W].
66 E.g., Relypsa, Inc., Manufacturing and Supply Agreement Between Lanxess
Corporation and Relypsa, Inc. (Form 10-K) Exhibit 10.6 (Mar. 19, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1416792/000119312514104575/d678
553dex106.htm [https://perma.cc/ZA84-VD3L].
67 E.g., Landmark Infrastructure Partners LP, Patent License Agreement with
American Infrastructure Funds, LLC (Form S-11/A) Exhibit 10.7 (Oct. 30, 2014)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1615346/000104746914008674/
a2221760zex-10_7.htm [https://perma.cc/J27N-3S9E].
68 E.g., Zogenix, Inc., Manufacturing and Supply Agreement with Endo Ventures
Limited
(Form
10-Q)
Exhibit
10.2
(Aug.
6,
2014)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1375151/000137515114000006/ex10
2-2014630.htm [https://perma.cc/V8ME-TVTW].
69 E.g., Therapeutic Sols. Int’l, Inc., Distribution Agreement with S4S (UK)
Limited
(Form
8-K)
Exhibit
10.1
(June
18,
2013)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1419051/000107878213001228/f8k0
61713_ex10z1.htm [https://perma.cc/HDE7-7648].
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company.70 A supply agreement between an Ohio company and a
Taiwanese company.71 In each case, again, the contract in question
excluded the CISG. In each case, again, these exclusions were unnecessary because the CISG only applies where each of the parties
has its principal place of business in a country that has ratified the
CISG and, to date, neither Ireland nor England nor India nor Taiwan has done so.72
Third, and finally, there are hundreds of dataset contracts in
which the parties opted out of the CISG even though the contract
in question did not involve the sale of goods.73 A share purchase
agreement.74 A registration rights and stockholder agreement.75 A
master services agreement.76 An aircraft purchase agreement.77 It
is unnecessary to exclude the CISG from these contracts because
none of them involve the sale of “goods” as that term is defined by
the CISG. The dataset is, however, replete with such agreements in
which the CISG is excluded.

70 E.g., Cempra Pharm., Inc., API Manufacturing and Supply Agreement with
Wockhardt
Ltd.
(Form
10-K)
Exhibit
10.11
(Mar.
7,
2013
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1461993/000119312513096011/d445
006dex1011.htm [https://perma.cc/TL2R-TQJR].
71 E.g., PECO II, Inc., Supply Agreement with Delta Electronics, Inc. (Form 8K)
Exhibit
10.1
(May
22,
2009)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/845072/000111650209000863/peco1
01.htm [https://perma.cc/M3X8-4LWU].
72 See UNCITRAL, Status on CISG, supra note 5 (listing nations that have ratified the CISG and making no mention of England, Ireland, India, or Taiwan).
Hong Kong was coded as being a party to the CISG notwithstanding disagreement on this issue among U.S. courts. See infra note 84 (discussing U.S. case law
relating to the status of Hong Kong under the CISG).
73 See CISG art. 2(d) (stating that the CISG shall not apply to contracts for the
sale of “stocks, shares, investment securities, negotiable instruments or money”).
74 E.g., Sumitomo Heavy Indus. & Axcelis Techs., Inc., Share Purchase
Agreement with Sen Corporation, An Shi and Axcelis Co. (Form 8-K) Exhibit 10.1
(Feb.
27,
2009)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1113232/
000110465909012845/a09-6240_1ex10d1.htm [https://perma.cc/5RAF-228Y].
75 E.g., Spectrum Pharm., Inc., Registration Rights and Stockholder Agreement with TopoTarget A/S (Form 10-K) Exhibit 4.2 (Mar. 12, 2014)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/831547/000119312514094593/
d640093dex42.htm [https://perma.cc/9C6T-6HFM].
76 E.g., State St. Bank & Tr. Co., Master Services Agreement with Each BTC
Recipient
Listed
in
Exhibit
A,
Exhibit
10.5
(July
1,
2013)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1535365/000119312513277818/d482
189dex105.htm [https://perma.cc/3ACV-9BZZ].
77 See generally CISG art. 2(e) (stating that the CISG is not applicable to contracts for the sale of aircraft).
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Collectively, the proportion of U.S. contracts in the dataset in
which the CISG was unnecessarily excluded is significant, as illustrated by Table 1 below.78

Overall, approximately 69% of U.S. dataset contracts filed with the
SEC between 2009 and 2014 that opted out of the CISG did so
needlessly. It is, of course, common for attorneys to simply cut and
paste language from one contract into another without considering
whether that language is strictly necessary.79 And there is certainly
Table 1 was assembled in the following manner: First, I screened for U.S.
contracts in the primary dataset that were wholly domestic. Once these contracts
were identified and coded, they were set aside. Second, I screened the remaining
contracts for agreements in which the counterparty’s home country had not ratified the CISG. Once these contracts were identified and coded, they were also set
aside. Finally, I screened those contracts that remained for agreements that were
not for the sale of goods. The virtue of this approach was that no contract was
counted more than once. The vice of this approach is that it resulted in the undercounting of contracts that were not for the sale of goods. Non-sales contracts between (1) two U.S. parties, and (2) a U.S. party and foreign counterparty whose
home country has not ratified by the CISG, are not separately identified in Table 1.
79 See MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN 9394 (John M.
Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2013) (discussing the reasons for the practice of copying clauses in existing contracts and inserting them into new contracts without
considering costs or benefits to client); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”),
83 VA. L. REV. 713, 72324 (1997) (discussing potential benefits of using boiler78
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no harm in excluding the CISG from contracts to which it would
not otherwise apply. At the same time, the fact that just over twothirds of these contracts opted out of the CISG when there was no
need to do so suggests that the default position is to exclude the
treaty from any and all contracts. This pattern of practice indicates
that many U.S. companies reflexively exclude the CISG without
inquiring as to whether it would apply of its own force.
4.2. The Number of U.S. Contracts That Affirmatively Choose the
CISG is Tiny
When a dataset contract references the CISG, it invariably does
so either to exclude it or to choose it as the governing law. In 99% of
the primary dataset contracts—5,028 out of 5,092—the parties refer
to the CISG in order to exclude it. In just 1% of these agreements—
61 contracts out of 5,092—the parties refer to the CISG to state that
they want it to govern the agreement.80 The number of contracts
that affirmatively choose the CISG, moreover, appears to be on the
decline. There were actually fewer contracts in which U.S. companies affirmatively chose the CISG as their governing law in 2014

plate).
80 Technically, the survey disclosed exactly sixty-four contracts in which the
CISG was affirmatively chosen as the governing law, but in three cases the choice
was nonsensical or obviously done in error. See Auspex Sys., Inc., Auspex Systems, Inc. or Subsidiary Corporation (Herein “Auspex”) Authorized Reseller
Agreement between Auspex Systems, Inc., and Net Brains, Inc. (Form 10-Q, Exhibit 10.1, ¶ 21) (Nov. 6, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/860749/000089161801501949/f76765ex10-1.txt
[https://perma.cc/BA6EV62R] (calling for disputes to be submitted to “either the American Arbitration
Board or the United Nations (UN) Convention on contracts for the International
Sale of Goods (CISG)”); Interactive Telesis, Inc., Agreement for Services with
AT&T Corporation (Exhibit 10) (Apr. 21, 2000) (stating that agreement shall be
governed by both the CISG and the Uniform Commercial Code); Vantage Health,
Inc., Director Retainer Agreement with William S. Rees, Jr. (Form 8-K, Exhibit
10.2)
(Dec.
19,
2013),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1497130/000149315213002742/ex10
-2.htm [https://perma.cc/4BU4-SQK8] (selecting CISG to govern a contract between a U.S. company and a U.S. director whose purpose was to compensate a
director for his service on a corporate board). Within this subset of sixty-one contracts, nineteen were concluded between two foreign companies. This leaves exactly forty-two contracts out of a total dataset of 5,092 in which a U.S. company
entered into a contract where the CISG was expressly chosen as the governing
law.
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than there were in 1995, as illustrated by Table 2.81

These findings are difficult to reconcile with claims advanced
by some scholars that the CISG is gaining traction in the United
States.82 If the CISG were truly making inroads in the U.S. legal
community, one would expect to see a gradual increase in the
number of U.S. contracts in which it was affirmatively chosen as
the governing law. The goal of any contract is, after all, to clearly
express the intent of the parties. If the parties want the CISG to
81 This Table omits the nineteen contracts from the dataset that were exclusively between foreign parties, which are discussed in Part 5. Consequently, there
are forty-two contracts represented in Table 2. The 1998 spike of opt ins is attributable to a single Massachusetts company that entered into six separate contracts that chose the CISG in that year. That same company entered into two additional contracts that chose the CISG in 1996, which means that eight of the fortytwo contracts listed in Table 2 were negotiated by a single company.
82 See SPAGNOLO, supra note 26, at 167 (“Arguably, the studies of US lawyers .
. . demonstrate a trend towards exclusions slowly decreasing.”); Harry M. Flechtner, Changing the Opt-Out Tradition in the United States 34 (Univ. of Pittsburgh
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2010-10,
2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1571281 [https://perma.cc/2QPD-FAUD] (suggesting that market forces are “altering the traditional practice of U.S. lawyers to
advise their clients to opt out of the Convention in favor of the application U.S.
domestic sales law”); see also supra notes 1112 and accompanying text.
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provide the governing law, it is not unreasonable to think that they
would occasionally say as much in their agreement. In cases where
one of the parties has more than one place of business, for example,
and where one of these places of business is located in a nation that
has not ratified the CISG, the parties may want to affirmatively select the CISG to make clear that they want it to govern the agreement.83 Alternatively, if it is unclear as to whether the counterparty’s home country is a party to the CISG—as is currently the case
with Hong Kong—the parties may wish to select the CISG in order
to remove all doubts as to their intent.84 Parties entering into a distribution agreement may also want to affirmatively select the CISG
as the governing law—if this is in fact their intent—because most
courts have held that the treaty does not apply to distribution
agreements.85 Similarly, parties negotiating the rights to software
83 See CISG art. 1(2) (“The fact that the parties have their places of business in
different States is to be disregarded whenever this fact does not appear either
from the contract or from any dealings between, or from information disclosed by,
the parties at any time before or at the conclusion of the contract.”); id. art. 10(a)
(“If a party has more than one place of business, the place of business is that
which has the closest relationship to the contract and its performance, having regard to the circumstances known to or contemplated by the parties at any time
before or at the conclusion of the contract . . . .”).
84 Compare Am.'s Collectibles Network, Inc. v. Timlly (HK), 746 F. Supp. 2d
914, 920 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) and Innotex Precision Ltd. v. Horei Image Prods., Inc.,
679 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 135859 (N.D. Ga. 2009) (concluding that Hong Kong is not a
party to CISG), with Electrocraft Ark., Inc. v. Super Elec. Motors, Ltd., No.
4:09CV00318 SWW, 2009 WL 5181854, at *3 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 23, 2009), and CNA
Int'l Inc. v. Guangdon Kelon Electronical Holdings, No. 05 C 5734, 2008 WL
8901360, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 3, 2008) (concluding that Hong Kong is a party to
CISG).
85 See, e.g., Amco Ukrservice v. Am. Meter Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 681, 687 (E.D.
Pa. 2004) (holding CISG does not apply to distribution agreements); see also
DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 182 (3d ed. 2015) (“[T]he general
position of the courts [is] that the CISG does not apply to distribution agreements
. . . .”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); JAMES M. KLOTZ, INTERNATIONAL
SALES AGREEMENTS: AN ANNOTATED DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATING GUIDE 8 (2d ed.
2008) (“[A] distribution agreement has been held not to be a contract for the sale of
goods, but rather to be a framework agreement that will govern future sales of
goods. Thus, the CISG is not intended to apply to distribution agreements, and
most courts considering the issue have come to this conclusion.”). This conclusion runs contrary to the prevailing view among U.S. courts that Article 2 of the
UCC does apply to distribution agreements notwithstanding the fact that these
agreements can and often do address matters unrelated to sales. See Gruppo Essenziero Italiano, S.P.A. v. Aromi D’Italia, Inc., No. CCB0865, 2011 WL 3207555,
at *3 (D. Md. July 27, 2011) (“Although distributorship agreements are considered
contracts for the sale of goods under Maryland’s Uniform Commercial Code
(“UCC”), courts have held that such agreements are not considered contracts for
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licenses may want to name the CISG as the governing law due to
any lingering uncertainty as to whether software is a “good” to
which CISG would apply automatically.86 The consistent failure on
the part of contracting parties to select the CISG as the governing
law in any of these situations over the past two decades tends to
undercut the argument that the CISG is becoming a more important part of contracting practice in the United States.
4.3. There Is No Clear Locus of Support for the CISG in the United
States
A review of the dataset contracts offers no evidence suggesting
that the CISG has been embraced (1) in specific industries, (2) with
respect to specific products, or (3) in specific geographic areas
within the United States.87 While those U.S. companies that have
the sale of goods under the CISG.”); Gary L. Monserud, The Privileges of Suretyship
for Delegating Parties Under UCC Section 2-210 in Light of the New Restatement of
Suretyship, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1307, 1394 (1996) (alternation in original) (“Distribution agreements, which, by their inherent nature, are relational rather than
transactional contracts, are one such area being subjected to [UCC Article 2’s]
dominion.”). Accordingly, if parties wanted the CISG to apply to their international distribution agreements, they would be well advised to say as much in their
contract.
86 See Douglas A. Hass, A Gentlemen’s Agreement: Assessing the GNU General
Public License and its Adaptation to Linux, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 213, 22324
(2007) (discussing whether the CISG applies to software licenses). On the one
hand, software is by its nature intangible and hence dissimilar from most other
“goods.” On the other hand, software is often bought and sold on disks and other
tangible objects, which suggests that it may be a “good” within the meaning of the
CISG. A further complicating factor is whether the grant of a software license,
which is essentially a right to use the intellectual property of another, should be
categorized as a contract of sale. See Sarah Green & Djakhongir Saidov, Software as
Goods, J. BUS. L. 161, 175 (2007) (discussing the rights of a purchase of software). In
the United States, the question of whether software is a “good” within the meaning of Article 2 of the UCC has generally been answered in the affirmative. See,
e.g., Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670, 676 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding
software is a good under Article 2 of the UCC). Many—though not all—of the national judges called upon to answer the same question with respect to the CISG
have reached the same conclusion. See Hass, supra, at 22425 (discussing German
and Swiss cases holding that CISG applies to contracts for the sale of software).
To remove all doubt as to their intentions, therefore, parties to international software agreements would be well advised to select the CISG if that is, in fact, what
they want.
87 The CISG was affirmatively chosen to govern exactly sixty-one contracts in
the dataset. Of these, there were forty-two opt-in agreements involving at least
one U.S. party. The data presented below is derived from these forty-two con-
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chosen the CISG to govern their contracts do share a number of
common features, as discussed below, the pattern that emerges
from these opt-in contracts is one of idiosyncratic and somewhat
haphazard decisions at the company level rather than one of companies rallying around a common standard.
First, with respect to industry, the overwhelming majority of
U.S. companies whose contracts affirmatively selected the CISG
were located in the manufacturing sector.88 The largest subgroup
within this sector was comprised of semiconductor companies.89
The second largest subgroup was comprised of pharmaceutical
companies.90 To the extent that the CISG enjoys any pockets of
support within the United States, therefore, the data suggest that
these pockets of support may lie in the semiconductor industry, on
the one hand, and in the pharmaceutical industry, on the other.
Second, with respect to product, the most common item bought
and sold in these agreements was electronics equipment, including
semiconductors and their component parts.91 The second most
common product was computer software, followed by medical
equipment, industrial equipment, and pharmaceuticals.92
Finally, with respect to geographic location, a significant number of U.S. sellers that chose the CISG were located in California.93
tracts.
88 A total of thirty-four firms—out of forty-two—were based in the manufacturing sector based on their Standard Industrial Classification (“SIC”) code. All
companies registered with the SEC are assigned a number in accordance with the
SIC system. See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Rise of the Financial Advisors: An Empirical Study of the Division of Professional Fees in Large Bankruptcies, 82
AM. BANKR. L.J. 141, 155 n.43 (2008) (discussing federal government’s use of SIC
classifications).
89 Of the thirty-four firms in the manufacturing sector, thirteen of them produced electronics.
90 Of the thirty-four firms in the manufacturing sector, five of them produced
pharmaceuticals.
91 Of the forty-two contracts reviewed, a total of nine were for the sale of
semiconductors.
92 There were eight contracts for the sale of computer software, seven contracts for the sale of medical equipment, and five contracts for the sale of industrial equipment.
93 There were thirty-two contracts out of the forty-two surveyed in which the
seller had its principal place of business in the United States. The sellers in fifteen
of these contracts were based in California (48%). The sellers in nine of these contracts were based in Massachusetts (29%). There were, however, thirteen unique
U.S. sellers based in California as compared to only two unique U.S. sellers based
in Massachusetts; one Massachusetts seller entered into eight separate agreements
in which the CISG was chosen as the governing law. In terms of broad-based
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Indeed, there were almost as many California-based sellers as there
were sellers in all other U.S. states combined.94 The foreign buyers
in these contracts tended to be located in Europe, North America,
China, or Japan.95 With respect to U.S. buyers transacting with foreign sellers, there was no evidence of geographic clustering—the
buyers were scattered across the United States. The foreign sellers
in these contracts, however, tended to be based in Europe.
The prototypical U.S. firm that affirmatively selects the CISG,
therefore, is a California-based manufacturing company that sells
semiconductors to counterparties based in Europe, North America,
or the Far East. There are, however, relatively few contracts that
match this prototype exactly. Those contracts that do conform to
the prototype, moreover, tend to be older agreements negotiated
prior to 2003. Nevertheless, there were enough hints scattered
through the contracts dataset that California-based semiconductor
companies may be favorably disposed to the CISG to warrant further inquiry. To this end, I contacted a number of California based
attorneys who represent semiconductor companies to ask them if
these companies did, in fact, utilize the CISG with any regularity.
The answer was a clear and unequivocal no. One attorney with
fifteen years of practice experience in this area stated that “we generally exclude [the CISG] where we think it’s applicable” and that
“this is the approach I generally see with companies where the
lawyers are aware of the issue.”96 A different attorney who works
in-house at a well-known semiconductor manufacturer observed
support that spans multiple different companies, therefore, the CISG would seem
to enjoy more support among sellers in California than in Massachusetts.
94 In eight contracts, both the buyer and seller were based in the United
States. In some cases, the decision to select the CISG as the governing law between two U.S. entities may be explained by the context. In one contract, for example, the U.S. seller had previously purchased goods from an Italian seller and
was looking to immediately resell these same goods to a U.S. buyer. See Powersource Corp., Distribution Agreement between Econowatt Corporation and
Greenview Energy Inc. (Form 10-QSB, Exhibit 4.1, 2) (Nov. 30, 2001). In another,
the U.S. seller was a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign corporation and it appears that the true selling entity was the foreign corporation. Emy’s Salsa Aji Distrib. Co., Distributor Agreement with Orbital Group, LLC (Form SB-2, Exhibit
10.1) (Nov. 13, 2007). In other cases, however, it is not clear why the parties chose
the CISG to govern their wholly domestic sales agreement.
95 There were eleven North American counterparties (including U.S. buyers),
ten European counterparties, four Japanese counterparties, and three counterparties based in China or Hong Kong.
96 E-mail from Partner, Silicon Valley Law Firm, to author (Dec. 19, 2014) (on
file with author).
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that his company has long excluded the CISG from its international
contracts as a matter of policy.97 He cited “inconsistency” as to
when the CISG will apply and the fact that the “CISG generally
disfavors sellers” as reasons for this policy.98 Still another attorney
with more than twenty years of practice experience representing
semiconductor companies observed that “everyone is spooked by
the CISG” and that he had never seen a contract, or been part of a
negotiation, in which a U.S. semiconductor company proposed that
the CISG be selected as the governing law.99 The general practice,
he explained, was to exclude the CISG and try to have the contract
governed by the law of California or New York. As a fallback, he
said, companies would agree to have their contracts governed by
the law of Hong Kong or Singapore.100
Each of the attorneys interviewed was adamant that the CISG,
far from being embraced by California-based semiconductor companies, is actually strongly disfavored. A review of the remaining
opt-in contracts, moreover, failed to uncover any other industries,
products, or geographic locations within the United States in
which the CISG appears to have gained traction.
4.4. Some Companies That Have Previously Opted In to the CISG
Now Opt Out
While the CISG may lack widespread support, it was affirmatively selected in forty-two dataset contracts involving U.S. companies.101 In order to discover why the treaty had been embraced
by these companies, I sent letters to all of the U.S. companies that
were parties to these agreements, and to many of the foreign ones
as well, to ask why they had selected the CISG. Many of the letters
were returned to me as undeliverable. This was disappointing, but
not altogether surprising given that most of the contracts in question were executed prior to 2003. Many of the companies in ques97 E-mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Semiconductor Company, to author
(Feb. 20, 2015) (on file with author).
98 Id.
99 Telephone Interview with Partner, Silicon Valley Law Firm (Mar. 20, 2015).
100 He explained that these jurisdictions are generally perceived to be rough
U.S. equivalents when it came to the structure and content of their law because of
their historical connections with English law. Id.
101 It was also selected in nineteen contracts between two foreign companies.
These nineteen contracts are discussed at greater length in Part 5.
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tion had gone out of business or been acquired in the intervening
years. Ultimately, I received ten replies to my letters and followup e-mails. In three cases, the company replied to inform me that
that no information would be forthcoming in response to my inquiry. In seven cases, I was personally contacted by a company
representative via telephone or e-mail.102 These seven responses,
which are discussed at some length below, offer invaluable insight
into the process of corporate decision making with respect to
choice-of-law determinations as they relate to the CISG.
The most striking finding was that all seven of the company
representatives who contacted me reported that their company’s
general policy was to exclude the CISG. These responses were remarkable because each of these companies was contacted specifically because it had previously selected the CISG as the governing law in a
particular agreement. Indeed, the entire point of contacting these
companies was to try to figure out how and why they had embraced the CISG. If ever there were a group of U.S. companies that
was likely to contain at least one CISG enthusiast, this would have
been that group. In each instance, however, the company representative stated that the company typically excluded the CISG
from its international contracts as a matter of policy.
The company representatives offered a wide range of explanations as to why, precisely, their general policy was to exclude the
CISG. One representative observed that his company typically excluded the CISG because he and the other lawyers there were all
trained in the UCC—and hence more familiar with it—and because
there were more cases in which courts in the United States have
applied the UCC.103 A different representative noted that his company excluded the CISG from its contracts on the advice of an outside counsel who was generally more familiar with California law.
Still another representative stated that her company excluded the
CISG in its supply contracts because it preferred for its contracts to
be governed by national sales law whenever possible.104
102 It should be emphasized that the qualitative data outlined below are subject to many of the same biases that infect all surveys to one degree or another.
See supra notes 4749 and accompanying text (discussing survey bias). These biases are, however, somewhat less salient in this context because the information
derived from company interviews is being used to confirm conclusions generated
through a review of existing contracts.
103 Telephone Interview with Associate General Counsel, U.S. Company (Jan.
8, 2015).
104 E-mail from Legal Counsel, Swiss Pharmaceutical Company, to author
(Jan. 7, 2015) (on file with author).
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In two instances, the company representative was able to provide a more-or-less complete account of the process that led to the
CISG being chosen with respect to a particular agreement. In each
instance, the choice of the CISG was attributable to the presence of
special circumstances unlikely to arise in the ordinary course of
business. In the first case, the CISG was chosen because the parent
companies negotiating the contract were based in Mexico and
Hong Kong and the goods in question were to be transported from
Canada to Mexico via the United States before the buyer took delivery. Under these unusual circumstances, the representative explained, it made sense for the contract to be governed by a body of
law that was the same in all of the relevant jurisdictions.
In the second case, the company representative explained that
historical vagaries had led to a long tradition of commercial contracts with Russian (and, before that, Soviet) entities being governed by Swedish law.105 In the contract at issue, where the parties
were having difficulty reaching agreement on governing law, the
U.S. buyer had proposed that the parties draft their contract to
state that it would be governed by both the law of Sweden and the
CISG. The goal in this case, in other words, was to move away
from a body of law with which its attorneys were largely unfamiliar (Swedish law) and towards a body of law with which its attorneys were marginally more familiar (the CISG). This goal was realized when the Russian counterparty agreed to the proposal.
When the respondents outlined their basic hierarchy of preferences when it came to the governing law, virtually all of them expressed a clear preference for national law as an alternative to the
CISG. Their stated first preference was for the national sales law of
their “home” country. A second-best outcome was for the contract
to be governed by the national sales law of a “neutral” third country. The list of such countries whose law would be potentially acceptable included Canada, Delaware, England, France, Hong
Kong, New York, Singapore and Switzerland.106 Many of the re105 Telephone Interview with Associate General Counsel, U.S. Company (Jan.
8, 2015).
106 This same hierarchy of preferences was expressed by a different attorney—who works in-house at a major U.S. semiconductor manufacturer—whose
employer did not have any contracts in the dataset. He stated that his company
generally prefers to have its contracts governed by the law of Delaware, New
York, or Oregon. If a foreign counterparty is reluctant to have an agreement governed by U.S. law, however, the company will sometimes agree to have its con-
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spondents reported that if it came down to a choice between the
national sales law of a third country with no connection to the
transaction or the CISG, they would prefer the national sales law of
the third country. Again, this result was surprising because each
of the companies in question was contacted precisely because it
had affirmatively chosen the CISG as the governing law in the past.
In one instance, I received responses from companies that were
on opposite sides in a particular contract negotiation. The former
president of a U.S. pharmaceutical company e-mailed me to state
that he could not recall why the CISG was chosen to govern a contract between his Texas based company and a Swiss counterparty
in 2009.107 The Swiss counterparty also contacted me to report that
the company generally excluded the CISG from its international
agreements and that she could only “assume that the choice-of-law
provision in this particular contract was amended in the negotiations with [the U.S. counterparty].”108 In this particular case, therefore, neither contracting party was able to provide an explanation
as to why the CISG was selected as the governing law in their contract.
Finally, the president of a Virginia-based information technology company reported that his company has been engaged in various international transactions over the years. When asked about
the role that the CISG played in a reseller agreement from 2006, he
explained that the company used the “UN funding” for “world
court” purposes but that it switched to the Uniform Commercial
Code for purely domestic agreements.109 He then remarked upon
the importance of venue, stating that “if it’s the UN transactions,
then you’re at the world court in New York” and that you “can’t
choose to have international transactions governed by the North
Carolina Supreme Court.”110 This particular response indicates that
the CISG remains a largely unknown quantity in some quarters
tracts governed by the law of England, Wales, Hong Kong, or Singapore. E-mail
from In-House Counsel, U.S. Semiconductor Company, to author (Feb. 20, 2015)
(on file with author). This attorney also noted that his company excluded the
CISG from its contracts as a matter of policy. Id.
107 E-mail from former President, U.S. Pharmaceutical Company, to author
(Feb. 6, 2015) (on file with author).
108 E-mail from Legal Counsel, Swiss Pharmaceutical Company, to author (on
file with author) (alternations in original).
109 Telephone Interview with President, Virginia-based Information Technology Company (Jan. 20, 2015).
110 Id.
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more than twenty-five years after it entered into force.
* * *
In summary, the contract evidence derived from the dataset
suggests that the overwhelming majority of U.S. contracts that reference the CISG do so for the sole purpose of excluding it. It is
common for U.S. companies to exclude the CISG from contracts to
which it would never apply by its terms. The number of U.S. contracts in which the CISG is affirmatively chosen as the governing
law—never large—is declining. There does not appear to be a single industry or geographic location within the United States in
which companies have embraced the CISG as an alternative to national sales law. And some companies that affirmatively opted into the CISG in past years now report that their general practice is to
exclude the treaty from their international sales contracts.
The Global Sales Law Survey, it will be remembered, found
that only 54% of U.S. attorneys “sometimes” or “always” advise
their clients to opt out of the CISG.111 This result is impossible to
reconcile with the results from the review of the dataset contracts.
The dataset evidence suggests that the actual level of support for
the CISG among U.S. lawyers is much, much lower than suggested
by the Global Sales Law Survey. Whatever the merits of the CISG,
it has made scant little headway in gaining adherents among practicing lawyers in the United States in the twenty-eight years since it
entered into force.
5. EVIDENCE OF VARYING PRACTICE IN CHINA
Although U.S. companies have failed to embrace the CISG, the
same cannot be said for companies in other nations. There were a
number of contracts in the dataset—nineteen to be exact—in which
two foreign companies affirmatively chose the CISG as the law to
govern their agreement. A review of these wholly foreign contracts is useful because it offers a sense of how the CISG is used
when no U.S. company is a party to the transaction. As it so happens, a review of these wholly foreign contracts reveals a pattern of
practice that is quite different from the practice evidenced in the
111

See supra notes 3738.
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U.S. agreements. More than two-thirds of the wholly foreign contracts (thirteen out of nineteen) were sales contracts involving a
Chinese solar company.112 All of these agreements were negotiated
after 2007. All of them called for the sale of materials used in the
construction of solar panels.113 And all of them affirmatively selected the CISG as the governing law.114
The finding that Chinese solar companies have embraced the
CISG in their international sales contracts indicates that the perceived utility of that treaty in transactional planning can vary by
nationality and industry. The mere fact that the CISG has made little headway in the United States, in short, does not mean that it is
failing to achieve its broader goal of facilitating international trade.
Indeed, the fact that some Chinese companies routinely choose to
opt in to the CISG suggests a possible pathway by which the CISG
could come to be more broadly accepted by U.S. companies.115 As
Lisa Spagnolo has written: “China’s relatively strong economic position . . . could ultimately serve to slowly force CISG exposure on
more reluctant jurisdictions such as the US, Canada, and Australia,
where environments of unfamiliarity and high learning costs so far
still harbour automatic opt-outs.”116 While time alone will determine the extent to which Chinese choice-of-law preferences will influence U.S. practice, the claim that Chinese companies are marginally more supportive of the CISG than those in many other
jurisdictions derives strong support from the patterns of practice
among the dataset contracts.117
This claim derives further support from a phone interview that
I conducted with several representatives from a Chinese solar
Seven different Chinese solar companies were parties to at least one of
these agreements.
113 Three of the remaining contracts were entered into by a single Peruvian
buyer seeking to obtain various pieces of large industrial equipment from sellers
in Germany, Russia, Brazil, and Peru. Two contracts were negotiated by a single
Canadian fuel cell company with counterparties in South Korea and Japan. In the
final contract, a Brazilian company contracted to sell pharmaceuticals to a Chinese
buyer.
114 The counterparties to the contracts with Chinese solar companies were
overwhelmingly located in Europe.
115 See Lisa Spagnolo, Green Eggs and Ham: The CISG, Path Dependence, and the
Behavioural Economics of Lawyers’ Choices of Law in International Sales Contracts, 6 J.
PRIV. INT’L L. 417, 427 – 28 (2010).
116 Id. at 463.
117 See Schroeter, supra note 12, at 654 (criticizing U.S. courts for requiring
“explicit” opt-outs from the CISG and arguing that this approach is at odds with
the purpose and legislative history of Article 6).
112
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company based in Shanghai. The company for which they worked
had entered into a contract that selected the CISG to govern the
sale of solar panels from the Chinese seller to a Spanish buyer.118
One company representative, who dealt primarily with customers
in Europe, explained that the company generally preferred to have
its sales contracts governed by the CISG rather than by national
law.119 When asked why, she stated that the CISG offered “very
clear and simple remedies to the seller.”120 She observed that most
of the company’s counterparties in Europe were “sophisticated
buyers” and that these buyers were generally open to having the
CISG govern the sales agreement.121 She also explained that in the
rare cases in which a European counterparty insisted that the CISG
be excluded, and balked at the selection of Chinese law, the company’s preference was to have the contract be governed by German
national sales law because it is relatively easy for Chinese lawyers
to research German law.122
This same representative noted that it was somewhat unusual
for the company to affirmatively name the CISG as the governing
law in the contract. Ordinarily, she explained, the company would
simply select the law of Germany without making any reference to
the CISG at all.123 In making this selection, she added, the company was fully aware that the CISG would often apply as a default
rule despite the fact that the treaty was not expressly mentioned
anywhere in the agreement.124
A different representative from the same company who dealt
primarily with customers in Australia then pointed out that the
company’s contracting practice was quite different when it came to
Australian counterparties.125 The Australians, he explained, typically insisted that the CISG be excluded from their international
sales contracts.126 Still another representative then chimed in to
add that it was also common for customers in England to request
118 Telephone Interview with Legal Counsel at Chinese Solar Company (Feb.
10, 2015).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
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that the CISG be excluded.127 A different representative who dealt
with the Japanese market added that there was a greater variety of
practices when it came to Japanese buyers. Some were happy to
have the CISG govern the contract, while others insisted that it be
excluded.128
Significantly, the representatives from this particular Chinese
solar company were the only attorneys I spoke to in the course of
researching this Article who expressed real enthusiasm for the
CISG. In stark contrast to their U.S. counterparts, the CISG was the
clear first preference of these Chinese attorneys when drafting
choice-of-law clauses. Their second preference was for Chinese or
German national law. When these options were unavailable, they
would sometimes accept the national sales law of England, Australia, or Japan.
This enthusiasm for the CISG among Chinese solar companies
may be attributable to the fact that Chinese national sales law bears
more than a passing resemblance to the CISG.129 In 1999, China
undertook a substantial revision of the country’s contract law. In
undertaking these revisions, the Chinese drafters “consulted and
absorbed rules of the CISG on offer, acceptance, avoidance (termination), . . . liabilities for breach of contract, interpretation of a contract, and sales contract.”130 This reliance has prompted at least
one commentator to observe that “the CISG has quite a lot of impact on [Chinese Contract Law].”131 In some ways, therefore, the
Chinese embrace of the CISG is less a manifestation of a commitment to the harmonization of international commercial law than an
attempt to have the contract governed by a variant of Chinese national sales law. For better or worse, most companies crave the
familiar when it comes to choice of law. To the extent that the
CISG is more familiar to Chinese companies as a result of its having been substantially incorporated into Chinese domestic law, it
stands to reason that these companies would be more open to
Id.
Id.
129 See DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE, HAROLD HONGJU KOH & HANNAH
L. BUXBAUM, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 255 (5th ed. 2014) (explaining
how drafters of China’s 1999 Contract Law deliberately modeled provisions after
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the CISG).
130 Shiyuan Han, The CISG and Modernisation of Chinese Contract Law, 17
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE STUDY OF INT’L TRADE AND ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
S. PAC. 71 (2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
131 Id. at 79.
127
128
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choosing the CISG in their international sales agreements.
6. SELECTING THE LAW OF A U.S. STATE
The analysis in preceding Parts examined contract practice
where the contract in question referenced the CISG. This methodological approach may, however, fail to fully capture the nature of
U.S. contract practice with respect to the CISG. As noted above, it
is possible for the CISG to supply the governing law even where a
contract makes no mention of it. When parties choose to have their
international sales contract governed by the law of New York, for
example, the contract will typically be governed by the CISG. U.S.
courts have reasoned that New York law necessarily includes all
forms of federal law, and that the CISG—as a properly ratified federal treaty—is therefore a part of the law of New York.132 To select
the law of New York, therefore, is to select the CISG indirectly.133
If U.S. firms routinely select the law of a particular U.S. state in full
knowledge that this selection will result in the application of the
CISG, then it may well be that the treaty is making inroads into
U.S. practice in ways that are not captured by the analysis in the
preceding Parts.134
In order to test this possibility, I worked with a team of research assistants to assemble a secondary contract dataset. This
dataset consisted of international supply contracts filed with the
SEC between 2011 and 2015. Each research assistant was instructed to conduct a search for “supply /2 agreement” in the “Material
Contracts” section of the EDGAR database. These searches were
conducted through the LexisNexis portal. They resulted in 5,549
hits. A research assistant then reviewed each of these agreements
to determine whether the contract at issue was an “international”
supply agreement involving at least one U.S. party and one foreign
See supra note 61.
See Am. Mint LLC v. GOSoftware, Inc., Civil Action No. 1:05-CV-650, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45003, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2005) (“The alleged contract in this
case contains a provision selecting Georgia law as the law governing disputes under the contract; however, the contract fails to expressly exclude the CISG by language which affirmatively states it does not apply.”) (citation omitted).
134 But see Ingeborg Schwenzer & Christopher Kee, International Sales Law—
The Actual Practice, 425 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 425, 435 (2011) (observing that “some
parties do believe that they are excluding the CISG when simply not mentioning it
in their choice-of-law clause”).
132
133
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counterparty. Once this process was complete, I was left with 248
international supply agreements.
I then reviewed each of these agreements to determine: (1)
whether it excluded the CISG; (2) whether the foreign counterparty
had its principal place of business in a country that had not ratified
the CISG; (3) whether the agreement was an amendment to a prior
agreement; (4) whether the agreement in question selected foreign
law; and (5) whether it was a repeat of another contract in the secondary dataset. If the answer to any of the preceding queries was
in the affirmative, I eliminated the contract from the dataset.135 After this review was complete, I was left with a group of forty-four
international supply agreements, each of which contained a choiceof-law clause selecting the law of a U.S. state and none of which
excluded the CISG. Although the CISG went unmentioned in
these contracts, it would likely have supplied the governing law.
I then sent letters to the forty-four U.S. companies that were
party to each of these contracts to ask what they intended when
they selected the law of a U.S. state to govern the contract. Did
they intend for the contract to be governed by the CISG? Or did
they intend for the contract to be governed by the chosen U.S.
state’s version of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code? I received nine responses.136 Significantly, not a single respondent indicated that the company intended to select the CISG when it chose
the law of a U.S. state.
One respondent stated: “We did not consider CISG at all.”137
Another noted (somewhat ruefully) that: “We had no clue. Our
intent when we signed that agreement was absolutely that it was
going to be governed by the law of the state of Florida.”138 Another
135 Ultimately, I eliminated: forty-nine contracts from the secondary dataset
because they opted out of the CISG; forty-four contracts because the counterparty
had its place of business in a country that had not ratified the CISG; thirty-seven
contracts because they selected the law of a country that had ratified the CISG;
and one contract because it opted in to the CISG. The remaining seventy-four
contracts were excluded because they: (1) were repeats; (2) were amendments to
previous contracts; (3) were formatted in a manner that made them unreadable; or
(4) did not contain a choice-of-law clause.
136 In two cases, a company responded merely to inform me that it would not
provide an answer to the question.
137 E-mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Pharmaceutical Company I, to author
(Feb. 29, 2016) (on file with author).
138 Telephone Interview with General Counsel, U.S. Manufacturing Company
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respondent observed that: “We did not intend for the stated choice
of law to be eviscerated by the CISG. We have an updated provision in our new contracts to explicitly disclaim the effect of the
CISG, but several legacy agreements (done when we were less sophisticated) have not been updated.”139 Another respondent queried whether the contract in question would actually have been
governed by the CISG since it dealt with a number of issues in addition to sales, but stated that the company’s general policy was to
opt out: “We do not have a policy of choosing the CISG indirectly
and we would affirmatively state that it was to govern if that was
the intent.”140 Another respondent declared that: “I am not aware
that we have ever had occasion to think about the point you
raise.”141 Yet another respondent stated that: “We would never select the law of Indiana, say, as a means of getting the [CISG]. We
are just not that Machiavellian.”142 None of these responses are
consistent with the notion that U.S. companies routinely select the
CISG indirectly by choosing the law of a U.S. state. They suggest
instead that these companies are often unaware that the selection
of U.S. state law will result in the application of the CISG and, consequently, unknowingly fail to opt out.143
These findings are generally consistent with ordinary intuitions
about how corporate lawyers go about their work. Transactional
attorneys as a group, and particularly those attorneys who advise
public companies, tend to prefer contracts that are clear to those
that are opaque. If these attorneys wanted the CISG to supply the
governing law with respect to a contract, one would expect them to
say as much in their choice-of-law clauses.144 One would not ex(Apr. 11, 2016).
139 E-mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Technology Company, to Author
(Mar. 4, 2016) (on file with author).
140 E-mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Pharmaceutical Company II, to Author (Feb. 29, 2016) (on file with author).
141 E-mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Energy Company I, to Author (Mar.
18, 2016) (on file with author).
142 Telephone Interview with General Counsel, U.S. Investment Company
(Apr. 15, 2016).
143 See Gilles Cuniberti, Is the CISG Benefiting Anybody?, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1511, 1513 (2006) (arguing that “the vast majority of . . . buyers and
sellers have not benefited [from the CISG], due to a lack of sophistication.”).
144 To illustrate this point, consider the following two scenarios. In the first,
the parties say: “We would like for this contract to be governed by the CISG.
Therefore, we will choose New York law but will make no mention of the CISG
because we know that the choice of New York law will result in the CISG’s application so long as we do not specifically exclude it.” In the second, the parties say:
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pect them to select the CISG indirectly by relying on an interpretive rule that most, though not quite all, U.S. courts have decided
to follow.145 Moreover, choice-of-law issues are not always at the
forefront of the attorneys’ minds when they are drafting commercial agreements.146 As one respondent explained:
[I]n the ordinary course of commerce, where there are lots
of contracts flying around all the time, and time/cost are
always issues, it is not uncommon to agree to a choice of
law without doing a detailed analysis of how that jurisdiction’s laws work for you or against you. Unless you have a
crystal ball, you don’t know what your issues are going to
be, so you don’t always know what to worry about . . . Often, you agree to go with a particular jurisdiction’s laws because (i) it’s a bigger state (e.g., NY or CA) that you know
will have plenty of precedent to work with, (ii) you worry
about being home towned by your counter-party (I know,
venue is different from choice of law, but they do get
blurred a little), (iii) you do have particular experience on a
particular point that you think might be relevant, or (iv)
something else dictates (lenders, a prime contract, etc.). In
truth, I usually worry more about the venue than the choice
of law.147
Amid these many competing priorities, this respondent concluded that he “would bet that the folks on both sides of the
agreement were not aware of the CISG and the manner in which it

“We would like this contract to be governed by the CISG. Therefore, we will reference the CISG and specify that New York law shall govern all matters not covered by the CISG.” While it is certainly possible that some U.S. attorneys whose
clients wanted the CISG to apply would adopt the first approach to contract drafting, it seems more plausible that most would adopt the second.
145 At least one court has declined to follow this interpretive rule. See Am.
Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties, 411 F. Supp. 2d 61, 63 (D.R.I. 2006)
(concluding that a choice-of-law clause selecting the law of Rhode Island was sufficient for the court to deny the application of the CISG to the case).
146 See LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 698
(7th ed. 2015) (“[S]urprisingly often, the parties do not even bother to research the
chosen law before they include a clause selecting it.”).
147 E-mail from In-House Counsel, U.S. Energy Company II, to Author (Mar.
3, 2016) (on file with author).
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trumps local law.”148
* * *
In light of the foregoing analysis, it seems clear that the conclusion set forth above—that the CISG has no real constituency
among public companies in the United States—still holds.149 The
data generated by the contracts in the secondary dataset provide
little support for the notion that U.S. companies routinely select the
CISG indirectly by choosing the law of a particular U.S. state. This
data also suggests that the interpretive rule followed by most U.S.
judges to date—that U.S. state law necessarily includes federal law,
and that the selection of law of a particular state amounts to the
choice of the CISG—does not necessarily align with the expectations of U.S. companies entering into state law contracts.150 In
summary, there is no evidence from the secondary dataset that U.S.
companies that select the law of a U.S. state want the CISG to govern their international supply agreements.151

7. CONCLUSION
In much of the legal literature, the fact that the CISG has been
ratified by eight-five nations constitutes incontrovertible evidence
of the treaty’s success. The problem with this account is that it fails
Id.
When a U.S. company is a party to an international sales contract containing a choice-of-law clause selecting foreign law, there may be an element of
gamesmanship. In these cases, the U.S. company may strategically concede the
choice of governing law in full knowledge that the contract will be governed by
the CISG rather than the national sales law of the foreign nation. The Chinese solar company discussed in the previous Part followed precisely this strategy when
it agreed on its international sales contracts being governed by German law. See
supra note 124 and accompanying text. It would make little sense, however, for a
U.S. company to follow such a strategy when the law chosen is the law of U.S. jurisdiction.
150 See generally Johnson, supra note 61 (discussing cases in which parties in a
suit had chosen a state law to govern without realizing CISG would apply by default).
151 Cf. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J.
393, 414 (2004) (“If the reason for the gap was that the parties did not even consider the issue addressed by the default rule, it is much harder to infer consent to the
rule.”).
148
149
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to acknowledge that private parties can choose to exclude the CISG
from their international sales contracts. The fact that U.S. companies routinely choose to exclude the CISG necessarily calls into
question whether the CISG is actually achieving its goal of facilitating international trade. In order to answer to this question, it
would be helpful if scholars were to conduct additional contract
surveys outside the United States in order to determine whether
U.S. practice is representative or atypical. As discussed above, the
Global Sales Survey arguably overstates the level of support that
the CISG enjoys within the United States by a significant margin.
If this same survey also overstates the CISG’s support in foreign
jurisdictions, such a finding would necessitate a thorough reevaluation of the treaty’s efficacy.
Even in the absence of additional information relating to foreign contract practice, the evidence relating to U.S. practice raises
difficult questions about the current role of the CISG in resolving
transnational disputes in U.S. courts. As things currently stand,
the CISG often applies only where the U.S. contracting party is unsophisticated.152 In a number of cases in which the CISG has come
up in U.S. litigation, the parties seem to have had no idea that it
would apply ex ante.153 It is plausible—indeed, it is likely—that
Sophisticated U.S. companies are more likely to opt out of the CISG. Email from In-House Counsel, U.S. Technology Company, to Author (Mar. 4, 2016)
(on file with the author) (explaining that “[w]e did not intend for the stated choice
of law to be eviscerated by the CISG. We have an updated provision in our new
contracts to explicitly disclaim the effect of the CISG, but several legacy agreements (done when we were less sophisticated) have not been updated.”) (emphasis
added).
153 Reimann, supra note 62, at 123 – 24 (finding that the CISG applied in many
cases because the parties did not opt out, rather than because they meant for the
CISG to apply); see also Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F. Supp.
2d 426, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“In this case, the parties each attempted to opt out of
the CISG, but could not agree on the law to displace it . . . [and so] their competing
choices must fall away, leaving the CISG to fill the void by its own self-executing
force.”). There appears to be only one published case in the United States in
which the parties affirmatively chose the CISG to govern their agreement. See
Harry M. Flechtner & Ronald A. Brand, Opting In to the CISG: Avoiding the Redline Products Problems, in A TRIBUTE TO JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY 97 (Mads Bryde Andersen & René Franz Henschel eds., Djøf Publishing, Copenhagen 2015). In that
case, however, the parties also chose the law of South Africa—a nation that has not
ratified the CISG—as the law to govern their agreement. Id. This inconsistency
undercut the notion that the parties in question truly wanted the CISG to govern
their agreement. In light of the confusion engendered by the conflicting choice-oflaw clauses, the court ultimately applied New Jersey law. See FPM Fin. Serv., LLC
v. Redline Prods. Ltd., Civil Action No. 10-6118 (MAS) (LHG), 2013 WL 5288005,
at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2013).
152
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many of these parties would have excluded the CISG if they had
known enough to do so. This raises serious questions as to whether the CISG accurately captures the unstated preferences of the U.S.
parties to these international sales agreements. Over time, it may
be that the cases generated by international sales contracts that fail
to exclude the CISG will produce a body of case law that may lead
more sophisticated companies to adopt it. For now, however, the
burden of developing this case law would seem to fall primarily
upon U.S. litigants who do not know enough to exclude it.
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